[kernel] ocf: move all stuff into files, and fix build error on .25

git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/trunk@13288 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73

1 files changed, 1375 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/target/linux/generic-2.6/files/crypto/ocf/ep80579/icp_asym.c b/target/linux/generic-2.6/files/crypto/ocf/ep80579/icp_asym.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1a9bd28bf4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/target/linux/generic-2.6/files/crypto/ocf/ep80579/icp_asym.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1375 @@
+/***************************************************************************
+ *
+ * This file is provided under a dual BSD/GPLv2 license.  When using or 
+ *   redistributing this file, you may do so under either license.
+ * 
+ *   GPL LICENSE SUMMARY
+ * 
+ *   Copyright(c) 2007,2008 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ * 
+ *   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify 
+ *   it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as
+ *   published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ * 
+ *   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but 
+ *   WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 
+ *   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU 
+ *   General Public License for more details.
+ * 
+ *   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 
+ *   along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software 
+ *   Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St - Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ *   The full GNU General Public License is included in this distribution 
+ *   in the file called LICENSE.GPL.
+ * 
+ *   Contact Information:
+ *   Intel Corporation
+ * 
+ *   BSD LICENSE 
+ * 
+ *   Copyright(c) 2007,2008 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ *   All rights reserved.
+ * 
+ *   Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 
+ *   modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 
+ *   are met:
+ * 
+ *     * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 
+ *       notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *     * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 
+ *       notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 
+ *       the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 
+ *       distribution.
+ *     * Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its 
+ *       contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived 
+ *       from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ * 
+ *   THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS 
+ *   "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT 
+ *   LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR 
+ *   A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT 
+ *   OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 
+ *   SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT 
+ *   LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, 
+ *   DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY 
+ *   THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT 
+ *   (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE 
+ *   OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * 
+ *  version: Security.L.1.0.130
+ *
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+#include "icp_ocf.h"
+
+/*The following define values (containing the word 'INDEX') are used to find
+the index of each input buffer of the crypto_kop struct (see OCF cryptodev.h).
+These values were found through analysis of the OCF OpenSSL patch. If the
+calling program uses different input buffer positions, these defines will have
+to be changed.*/
+
+/*DIFFIE HELLMAN buffer index values*/
+#define ICP_DH_KRP_PARAM_PRIME_INDEX				(0)
+#define ICP_DH_KRP_PARAM_BASE_INDEX				(1)
+#define ICP_DH_KRP_PARAM_PRIVATE_VALUE_INDEX			(2)
+#define ICP_DH_KRP_PARAM_RESULT_INDEX				(3)
+
+/*MOD EXP buffer index values*/
+#define ICP_MOD_EXP_KRP_PARAM_BASE_INDEX			(0)
+#define ICP_MOD_EXP_KRP_PARAM_EXPONENT_INDEX			(1)
+#define ICP_MOD_EXP_KRP_PARAM_MODULUS_INDEX			(2)
+#define ICP_MOD_EXP_KRP_PARAM_RESULT_INDEX			(3)
+
+#define SINGLE_BYTE_VALUE					(4)
+
+/*MOD EXP CRT buffer index values*/
+#define ICP_MOD_EXP_CRT_KRP_PARAM_PRIME_P_INDEX			(0)
+#define ICP_MOD_EXP_CRT_KRP_PARAM_PRIME_Q_INDEX			(1)
+#define ICP_MOD_EXP_CRT_KRP_PARAM_I_INDEX			(2)
+#define ICP_MOD_EXP_CRT_KRP_PARAM_EXPONENT_DP_INDEX		(3)
+#define ICP_MOD_EXP_CRT_KRP_PARAM_EXPONENT_DQ_INDEX		(4)
+#define ICP_MOD_EXP_CRT_KRP_PARAM_COEFF_QINV_INDEX		(5)
+#define ICP_MOD_EXP_CRT_KRP_PARAM_RESULT_INDEX			(6)
+
+/*DSA sign buffer index values*/
+#define ICP_DSA_SIGN_KRP_PARAM_DGST_INDEX			(0)
+#define ICP_DSA_SIGN_KRP_PARAM_PRIME_P_INDEX			(1)
+#define ICP_DSA_SIGN_KRP_PARAM_PRIME_Q_INDEX			(2)
+#define ICP_DSA_SIGN_KRP_PARAM_G_INDEX				(3)
+#define ICP_DSA_SIGN_KRP_PARAM_X_INDEX				(4)
+#define ICP_DSA_SIGN_KRP_PARAM_R_RESULT_INDEX			(5)
+#define ICP_DSA_SIGN_KRP_PARAM_S_RESULT_INDEX			(6)
+
+/*DSA verify buffer index values*/
+#define ICP_DSA_VERIFY_KRP_PARAM_DGST_INDEX			(0)
+#define ICP_DSA_VERIFY_KRP_PARAM_PRIME_P_INDEX			(1)
+#define ICP_DSA_VERIFY_KRP_PARAM_PRIME_Q_INDEX			(2)
+#define ICP_DSA_VERIFY_KRP_PARAM_G_INDEX			(3)
+#define ICP_DSA_VERIFY_KRP_PARAM_PUBKEY_INDEX			(4)
+#define ICP_DSA_VERIFY_KRP_PARAM_SIG_R_INDEX			(5)
+#define ICP_DSA_VERIFY_KRP_PARAM_SIG_S_INDEX			(6)
+
+/*DSA sign prime Q vs random number K size check values*/
+#define DONT_RUN_LESS_THAN_CHECK				(0)
+#define FAIL_A_IS_GREATER_THAN_B				(1)
+#define FAIL_A_IS_EQUAL_TO_B					(1)
+#define SUCCESS_A_IS_LESS_THAN_B				(0)
+#define DSA_SIGN_RAND_GEN_VAL_CHECK_MAX_ITERATIONS		(500)
+
+/* We need to set a cryptokp success value just in case it is set or allocated
+   and not set to zero outside of this module */
+#define CRYPTO_OP_SUCCESS					(0)
+
+static int icp_ocfDrvDHComputeKey(struct cryptkop *krp);
+
+static int icp_ocfDrvModExp(struct cryptkop *krp);
+
+static int icp_ocfDrvModExpCRT(struct cryptkop *krp);
+
+static int
+icp_ocfDrvCheckALessThanB(CpaFlatBuffer * pK, CpaFlatBuffer * pQ, int *doCheck);
+
+static int icp_ocfDrvDsaSign(struct cryptkop *krp);
+
+static int icp_ocfDrvDsaVerify(struct cryptkop *krp);
+
+static void
+icp_ocfDrvDhP1CallBack(void *callbackTag,
+		       CpaStatus status,
+		       void *pOpData, CpaFlatBuffer * pLocalOctetStringPV);
+
+static void
+icp_ocfDrvModExpCallBack(void *callbackTag,
+			 CpaStatus status,
+			 void *pOpData, CpaFlatBuffer * pResult);
+
+static void
+icp_ocfDrvModExpCRTCallBack(void *callbackTag,
+			    CpaStatus status,
+			    void *pOpData, CpaFlatBuffer * pOutputData);
+
+static void
+icp_ocfDrvDsaVerifyCallBack(void *callbackTag,
+			    CpaStatus status,
+			    void *pOpData, CpaBoolean verifyStatus);
+
+static void
+icp_ocfDrvDsaRSSignCallBack(void *callbackTag,
+			    CpaStatus status,
+			    void *pOpData,
+			    CpaBoolean protocolStatus,
+			    CpaFlatBuffer * pR, CpaFlatBuffer * pS);
+
+/* Name        : icp_ocfDrvPkeProcess
+ *
+ * Description : This function will choose which PKE process to follow
+ * based on the input arguments
+ */
+int icp_ocfDrvPkeProcess(device_t dev, struct cryptkop *krp, int hint)
+{
+	CpaStatus lacStatus = CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+
+	if (NULL == krp) {
+		DPRINTK("%s(): Invalid input parameters, cryptkop = %p\n",
+			__FUNCTION__, krp);
+		return EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (CPA_TRUE == atomic_read(&icp_ocfDrvIsExiting)) {
+		krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+		return ECANCELED;
+	}
+
+	switch (krp->krp_op) {
+	case CRK_DH_COMPUTE_KEY:
+		DPRINTK("%s() doing DH_COMPUTE_KEY\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		lacStatus = icp_ocfDrvDHComputeKey(krp);
+		if (CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS != lacStatus) {
+			EPRINTK("%s(): icp_ocfDrvDHComputeKey failed "
+				"(%d).\n", __FUNCTION__, lacStatus);
+			krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+			return ECANCELED;
+		}
+
+		break;
+
+	case CRK_MOD_EXP:
+		DPRINTK("%s() doing MOD_EXP \n", __FUNCTION__);
+		lacStatus = icp_ocfDrvModExp(krp);
+		if (CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS != lacStatus) {
+			EPRINTK("%s(): icp_ocfDrvModExp failed (%d).\n",
+				__FUNCTION__, lacStatus);
+			krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+			return ECANCELED;
+		}
+
+		break;
+
+	case CRK_MOD_EXP_CRT:
+		DPRINTK("%s() doing MOD_EXP_CRT \n", __FUNCTION__);
+		lacStatus = icp_ocfDrvModExpCRT(krp);
+		if (CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS != lacStatus) {
+			EPRINTK("%s(): icp_ocfDrvModExpCRT "
+				"failed (%d).\n", __FUNCTION__, lacStatus);
+			krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+			return ECANCELED;
+		}
+
+		break;
+
+	case CRK_DSA_SIGN:
+		DPRINTK("%s() doing DSA_SIGN \n", __FUNCTION__);
+		lacStatus = icp_ocfDrvDsaSign(krp);
+		if (CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS != lacStatus) {
+			EPRINTK("%s(): icp_ocfDrvDsaSign "
+				"failed (%d).\n", __FUNCTION__, lacStatus);
+			krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+			return ECANCELED;
+		}
+
+		break;
+
+	case CRK_DSA_VERIFY:
+		DPRINTK("%s() doing DSA_VERIFY \n", __FUNCTION__);
+		lacStatus = icp_ocfDrvDsaVerify(krp);
+		if (CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS != lacStatus) {
+			EPRINTK("%s(): icp_ocfDrvDsaVerify "
+				"failed (%d).\n", __FUNCTION__, lacStatus);
+			krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+			return ECANCELED;
+		}
+
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		EPRINTK("%s(): Asymettric function not "
+			"supported (%d).\n", __FUNCTION__, krp->krp_op);
+		krp->krp_status = EOPNOTSUPP;
+		return EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
+
+	return ICP_OCF_DRV_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/* Name        : icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes
+ *
+ * Description : This function is used to swap the byte order of a buffer.
+ * It has been seen that in general we are passed little endian byte order
+ * buffers, but LAC only accepts big endian byte order buffers.
+ */
+static void inline
+icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(u_int8_t * num, u_int32_t buff_len_bytes)
+{
+
+	int i;
+	u_int8_t *end_ptr;
+	u_int8_t hold_val;
+
+	end_ptr = num + (buff_len_bytes - 1);
+	buff_len_bytes = buff_len_bytes >> 1;
+	for (i = 0; i < buff_len_bytes; i++) {
+		hold_val = *num;
+		*num = *end_ptr;
+		num++;
+		*end_ptr = hold_val;
+		end_ptr--;
+	}
+}
+
+/* Name        : icp_ocfDrvDHComputeKey
+ *
+ * Description : This function will map Diffie Hellman calls from OCF
+ * to the LAC API. OCF uses this function for Diffie Hellman Phase1 and
+ * Phase2. LAC has a separate Diffie Hellman Phase2 call, however both phases
+ * break down to a modular exponentiation.
+ */
+static int icp_ocfDrvDHComputeKey(struct cryptkop *krp)
+{
+	CpaStatus lacStatus = CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+	void *callbackTag = NULL;
+	CpaCyDhPhase1KeyGenOpData *pPhase1OpData = NULL;
+	CpaFlatBuffer *pLocalOctetStringPV = NULL;
+	uint32_t dh_prime_len_bytes = 0, dh_prime_len_bits = 0;
+
+	/* Input checks - check prime is a multiple of 8 bits to allow for
+	   allocation later */
+	dh_prime_len_bits =
+	    (krp->krp_param[ICP_DH_KRP_PARAM_PRIME_INDEX].crp_nbits);
+
+	/* LAC can reject prime lengths based on prime key sizes, we just
+	   need to make sure we can allocate space for the base and
+	   exponent buffers correctly */
+	if ((dh_prime_len_bits % NUM_BITS_IN_BYTE) != 0) {
+		APRINTK("%s(): Warning Prime number buffer size is not a "
+			"multiple of 8 bits\n", __FUNCTION__);
+	}
+
+	/* Result storage space should be the same size as the prime as this
+	   value can take up the same amount of storage space */
+	if (dh_prime_len_bits !=
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_DH_KRP_PARAM_RESULT_INDEX].crp_nbits) {
+		DPRINTK("%s(): Return Buffer must be the same size "
+			"as the Prime buffer\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		krp->krp_status = EINVAL;
+		return EINVAL;
+	}
+	/* Switch to size in bytes */
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(dh_prime_len_bytes, dh_prime_len_bits);
+
+	callbackTag = krp;
+
+	pPhase1OpData = kmem_cache_zalloc(drvDH_zone, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (NULL == pPhase1OpData) {
+		APRINTK("%s():Failed to get memory for key gen data\n",
+			__FUNCTION__);
+		krp->krp_status = ENOMEM;
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	pLocalOctetStringPV = kmem_cache_zalloc(drvFlatBuffer_zone, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (NULL == pLocalOctetStringPV) {
+		APRINTK("%s():Failed to get memory for pLocalOctetStringPV\n",
+			__FUNCTION__);
+		kmem_cache_free(drvDH_zone, pPhase1OpData);
+		krp->krp_status = ENOMEM;
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	/* Link parameters */
+	pPhase1OpData->primeP.pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_DH_KRP_PARAM_PRIME_INDEX].crp_p;
+
+	pPhase1OpData->primeP.dataLenInBytes = dh_prime_len_bytes;
+
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(pPhase1OpData->primeP.pData, dh_prime_len_bytes);
+
+	pPhase1OpData->baseG.pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_DH_KRP_PARAM_BASE_INDEX].crp_p;
+
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(pPhase1OpData->baseG.dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_DH_KRP_PARAM_BASE_INDEX].crp_nbits);
+
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(pPhase1OpData->baseG.pData,
+			    pPhase1OpData->baseG.dataLenInBytes);
+
+	pPhase1OpData->privateValueX.pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_DH_KRP_PARAM_PRIVATE_VALUE_INDEX].crp_p;
+
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(pPhase1OpData->privateValueX.dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_DH_KRP_PARAM_PRIVATE_VALUE_INDEX].
+		      crp_nbits);
+
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(pPhase1OpData->privateValueX.pData,
+			    pPhase1OpData->privateValueX.dataLenInBytes);
+
+	/* Output parameters */
+	pLocalOctetStringPV->pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_DH_KRP_PARAM_RESULT_INDEX].crp_p;
+
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(pLocalOctetStringPV->dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_DH_KRP_PARAM_RESULT_INDEX].crp_nbits);
+
+	lacStatus = cpaCyDhKeyGenPhase1(CPA_INSTANCE_HANDLE_SINGLE,
+					icp_ocfDrvDhP1CallBack,
+					callbackTag, pPhase1OpData,
+					pLocalOctetStringPV);
+
+	if (CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS != lacStatus) {
+		EPRINTK("%s(): DH Phase 1 Key Gen failed (%d).\n",
+			__FUNCTION__, lacStatus);
+		icp_ocfDrvFreeFlatBuffer(pLocalOctetStringPV);
+		kmem_cache_free(drvDH_zone, pPhase1OpData);
+	}
+
+	return lacStatus;
+}
+
+/* Name        : icp_ocfDrvModExp
+ *
+ * Description : This function will map ordinary Modular Exponentiation calls
+ * from OCF to the LAC API.
+ *
+ */
+static int icp_ocfDrvModExp(struct cryptkop *krp)
+{
+	CpaStatus lacStatus = CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+	void *callbackTag = NULL;
+	CpaCyLnModExpOpData *pModExpOpData = NULL;
+	CpaFlatBuffer *pResult = NULL;
+
+	if ((krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_KRP_PARAM_MODULUS_INDEX].crp_nbits %
+	     NUM_BITS_IN_BYTE) != 0) {
+		DPRINTK("%s(): Warning - modulus buffer size (%d) is not a "
+			"multiple of 8 bits\n", __FUNCTION__,
+			krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_KRP_PARAM_MODULUS_INDEX].
+			crp_nbits);
+	}
+
+	/* Result storage space should be the same size as the prime as this
+	   value can take up the same amount of storage space */
+	if (krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_KRP_PARAM_MODULUS_INDEX].crp_nbits >
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_KRP_PARAM_RESULT_INDEX].crp_nbits) {
+		APRINTK("%s(): Return Buffer size must be the same or"
+			" greater than the Modulus buffer\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		krp->krp_status = EINVAL;
+		return EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	callbackTag = krp;
+
+	pModExpOpData = kmem_cache_zalloc(drvLnModExp_zone, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (NULL == pModExpOpData) {
+		APRINTK("%s():Failed to get memory for key gen data\n",
+			__FUNCTION__);
+		krp->krp_status = ENOMEM;
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	pResult = kmem_cache_zalloc(drvFlatBuffer_zone, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (NULL == pResult) {
+		APRINTK("%s():Failed to get memory for ModExp result\n",
+			__FUNCTION__);
+		kmem_cache_free(drvLnModExp_zone, pModExpOpData);
+		krp->krp_status = ENOMEM;
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	/* Link parameters */
+	pModExpOpData->modulus.pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_KRP_PARAM_MODULUS_INDEX].crp_p;
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(pModExpOpData->modulus.dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_KRP_PARAM_MODULUS_INDEX].
+		      crp_nbits);
+
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(pModExpOpData->modulus.pData,
+			    pModExpOpData->modulus.dataLenInBytes);
+
+	/*OCF patch to Openswan Pluto regularly sends the base value as 2
+	   bits in size. In this case, it has been found it is better to
+	   use the base size memory space as the input buffer (if the number
+	   is in bits is less than a byte, the number of bits is the input
+	   value) */
+	if (krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_KRP_PARAM_BASE_INDEX].crp_nbits <
+	    NUM_BITS_IN_BYTE) {
+		DPRINTK("%s : base is small (%d)\n", __FUNCTION__, krp->
+			krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_KRP_PARAM_BASE_INDEX].crp_nbits);
+		pModExpOpData->base.dataLenInBytes = SINGLE_BYTE_VALUE;
+		pModExpOpData->base.pData =
+		    (uint8_t *) & (krp->
+				   krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_KRP_PARAM_BASE_INDEX].
+				   crp_nbits);
+		*((uint32_t *) pModExpOpData->base.pData) =
+		    htonl(*((uint32_t *) pModExpOpData->base.pData));
+
+	} else {
+
+		DPRINTK("%s : base is big (%d)\n", __FUNCTION__, krp->
+			krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_KRP_PARAM_BASE_INDEX].crp_nbits);
+		pModExpOpData->base.pData =
+		    krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_KRP_PARAM_BASE_INDEX].crp_p;
+		BITS_TO_BYTES(pModExpOpData->base.dataLenInBytes,
+			      krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_KRP_PARAM_BASE_INDEX].
+			      crp_nbits);
+		icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(pModExpOpData->base.pData,
+				    pModExpOpData->base.dataLenInBytes);
+	}
+
+	pModExpOpData->exponent.pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_KRP_PARAM_EXPONENT_INDEX].crp_p;
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(pModExpOpData->exponent.dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_KRP_PARAM_EXPONENT_INDEX].
+		      crp_nbits);
+
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(pModExpOpData->exponent.pData,
+			    pModExpOpData->exponent.dataLenInBytes);
+	/* Output parameters */
+	pResult->pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_KRP_PARAM_RESULT_INDEX].crp_p,
+	    BITS_TO_BYTES(pResult->dataLenInBytes,
+			  krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_KRP_PARAM_RESULT_INDEX].
+			  crp_nbits);
+
+	lacStatus = cpaCyLnModExp(CPA_INSTANCE_HANDLE_SINGLE,
+				  icp_ocfDrvModExpCallBack,
+				  callbackTag, pModExpOpData, pResult);
+
+	if (CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS != lacStatus) {
+		EPRINTK("%s(): Mod Exp Operation failed (%d).\n",
+			__FUNCTION__, lacStatus);
+		krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+		icp_ocfDrvFreeFlatBuffer(pResult);
+		kmem_cache_free(drvLnModExp_zone, pModExpOpData);
+	}
+
+	return lacStatus;
+}
+
+/* Name        : icp_ocfDrvModExpCRT
+ *
+ * Description : This function will map ordinary Modular Exponentiation Chinese
+ * Remainder Theorem implementaion calls from OCF to the LAC API.
+ *
+ * Note : Mod Exp CRT for this driver is accelerated through LAC RSA type 2
+ * decrypt operation. Therefore P and Q input values must always be prime
+ * numbers. Although basic primality checks are done in LAC, it is up to the
+ * user to do any correct prime number checking before passing the inputs.
+ */
+
+static int icp_ocfDrvModExpCRT(struct cryptkop *krp)
+{
+	CpaStatus lacStatus = CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+	CpaCyRsaDecryptOpData *rsaDecryptOpData = NULL;
+	void *callbackTag = NULL;
+	CpaFlatBuffer *pOutputData = NULL;
+
+	/*Parameter input checks are all done by LAC, no need to repeat
+	   them here. */
+	callbackTag = krp;
+
+	rsaDecryptOpData = kmem_cache_zalloc(drvRSADecrypt_zone, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (NULL == rsaDecryptOpData) {
+		APRINTK("%s():Failed to get memory"
+			" for MOD EXP CRT Op data struct\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		krp->krp_status = ENOMEM;
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey
+	    = kmem_cache_zalloc(drvRSAPrivateKey_zone, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (NULL == rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey) {
+		APRINTK("%s():Failed to get memory for MOD EXP CRT"
+			" private key values struct\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		kmem_cache_free(drvRSADecrypt_zone, rsaDecryptOpData);
+		krp->krp_status = ENOMEM;
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->
+	    version = CPA_CY_RSA_VERSION_TWO_PRIME;
+	rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->
+	    privateKeyRepType = CPA_CY_RSA_PRIVATE_KEY_REP_TYPE_2;
+
+	pOutputData = kmem_cache_zalloc(drvFlatBuffer_zone, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (NULL == pOutputData) {
+		APRINTK("%s():Failed to get memory"
+			" for MOD EXP CRT output data\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		kmem_cache_free(drvRSAPrivateKey_zone,
+				rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey);
+		kmem_cache_free(drvRSADecrypt_zone, rsaDecryptOpData);
+		krp->krp_status = ENOMEM;
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->
+	    version = CPA_CY_RSA_VERSION_TWO_PRIME;
+	rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->
+	    privateKeyRepType = CPA_CY_RSA_PRIVATE_KEY_REP_TYPE_2;
+
+	/* Link parameters */
+	rsaDecryptOpData->inputData.pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_CRT_KRP_PARAM_I_INDEX].crp_p;
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(rsaDecryptOpData->inputData.dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_CRT_KRP_PARAM_I_INDEX].
+		      crp_nbits);
+
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(rsaDecryptOpData->inputData.pData,
+			    rsaDecryptOpData->inputData.dataLenInBytes);
+
+	rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->privateKeyRep2.prime1P.pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_CRT_KRP_PARAM_PRIME_P_INDEX].crp_p;
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->privateKeyRep2.
+		      prime1P.dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_CRT_KRP_PARAM_PRIME_P_INDEX].
+		      crp_nbits);
+
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->
+			    privateKeyRep2.prime1P.pData,
+			    rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->
+			    privateKeyRep2.prime1P.dataLenInBytes);
+
+	rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->privateKeyRep2.prime2Q.pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_CRT_KRP_PARAM_PRIME_Q_INDEX].crp_p;
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->privateKeyRep2.
+		      prime2Q.dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_CRT_KRP_PARAM_PRIME_Q_INDEX].
+		      crp_nbits);
+
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->
+			    privateKeyRep2.prime2Q.pData,
+			    rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->
+			    privateKeyRep2.prime2Q.dataLenInBytes);
+
+	rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->
+	    privateKeyRep2.exponent1Dp.pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_CRT_KRP_PARAM_EXPONENT_DP_INDEX].crp_p;
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->privateKeyRep2.
+		      exponent1Dp.dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->
+		      krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_CRT_KRP_PARAM_EXPONENT_DP_INDEX].
+		      crp_nbits);
+
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->
+			    privateKeyRep2.exponent1Dp.pData,
+			    rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->
+			    privateKeyRep2.exponent1Dp.dataLenInBytes);
+
+	rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->
+	    privateKeyRep2.exponent2Dq.pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_CRT_KRP_PARAM_EXPONENT_DQ_INDEX].crp_p;
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->
+		      privateKeyRep2.exponent2Dq.dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->
+		      krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_CRT_KRP_PARAM_EXPONENT_DQ_INDEX].
+		      crp_nbits);
+
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->
+			    privateKeyRep2.exponent2Dq.pData,
+			    rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->
+			    privateKeyRep2.exponent2Dq.dataLenInBytes);
+
+	rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->
+	    privateKeyRep2.coefficientQInv.pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_CRT_KRP_PARAM_COEFF_QINV_INDEX].crp_p;
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->
+		      privateKeyRep2.coefficientQInv.dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->
+		      krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_CRT_KRP_PARAM_COEFF_QINV_INDEX].
+		      crp_nbits);
+
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->
+			    privateKeyRep2.coefficientQInv.pData,
+			    rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey->
+			    privateKeyRep2.coefficientQInv.dataLenInBytes);
+
+	/* Output Parameter */
+	pOutputData->pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_CRT_KRP_PARAM_RESULT_INDEX].crp_p;
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(pOutputData->dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_CRT_KRP_PARAM_RESULT_INDEX].
+		      crp_nbits);
+
+	lacStatus = cpaCyRsaDecrypt(CPA_INSTANCE_HANDLE_SINGLE,
+				    icp_ocfDrvModExpCRTCallBack,
+				    callbackTag, rsaDecryptOpData, pOutputData);
+
+	if (CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS != lacStatus) {
+		EPRINTK("%s(): Mod Exp CRT Operation failed (%d).\n",
+			__FUNCTION__, lacStatus);
+		krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+		icp_ocfDrvFreeFlatBuffer(pOutputData);
+		kmem_cache_free(drvRSAPrivateKey_zone,
+				rsaDecryptOpData->pRecipientPrivateKey);
+		kmem_cache_free(drvRSADecrypt_zone, rsaDecryptOpData);
+	}
+
+	return lacStatus;
+}
+
+/* Name        : icp_ocfDrvCheckALessThanB
+ *
+ * Description : This function will check whether the first argument is less
+ * than the second. It is used to check whether the DSA RS sign Random K
+ * value is less than the Prime Q value (as defined in the specification)
+ *
+ */
+static int
+icp_ocfDrvCheckALessThanB(CpaFlatBuffer * pK, CpaFlatBuffer * pQ, int *doCheck)
+{
+
+	uint8_t *MSB_K = pK->pData;
+	uint8_t *MSB_Q = pQ->pData;
+	uint32_t buffer_lengths_in_bytes = pQ->dataLenInBytes;
+
+	if (DONT_RUN_LESS_THAN_CHECK == *doCheck) {
+		return FAIL_A_IS_GREATER_THAN_B;
+	}
+
+/*Check MSBs
+if A == B, check next MSB
+if A > B, return A_IS_GREATER_THAN_B
+if A < B, return A_IS_LESS_THAN_B (success)
+*/
+	while (*MSB_K == *MSB_Q) {
+		MSB_K++;
+		MSB_Q++;
+
+		buffer_lengths_in_bytes--;
+		if (0 == buffer_lengths_in_bytes) {
+			DPRINTK("%s() Buffers have equal value!!\n",
+				__FUNCTION__);
+			return FAIL_A_IS_EQUAL_TO_B;
+		}
+
+	}
+
+	if (*MSB_K < *MSB_Q) {
+		return SUCCESS_A_IS_LESS_THAN_B;
+	} else {
+		return FAIL_A_IS_GREATER_THAN_B;
+	}
+
+}
+
+/* Name        : icp_ocfDrvDsaSign
+ *
+ * Description : This function will map DSA RS Sign from OCF to the LAC API.
+ *
+ * NOTE: From looking at OCF patch to OpenSSL and even the number of input
+ * parameters, OCF expects us to generate the random seed value. This value
+ * is generated and passed to LAC, however the number is discared in the
+ * callback and not returned to the user.
+ */
+static int icp_ocfDrvDsaSign(struct cryptkop *krp)
+{
+	CpaStatus lacStatus = CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+	CpaCyDsaRSSignOpData *dsaRsSignOpData = NULL;
+	void *callbackTag = NULL;
+	CpaCyRandGenOpData randGenOpData;
+	int primeQSizeInBytes = 0;
+	int doCheck = 0;
+	CpaFlatBuffer randData;
+	CpaBoolean protocolStatus = CPA_FALSE;
+	CpaFlatBuffer *pR = NULL;
+	CpaFlatBuffer *pS = NULL;
+
+	callbackTag = krp;
+
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(primeQSizeInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_SIGN_KRP_PARAM_PRIME_Q_INDEX].
+		      crp_nbits);
+
+	if (DSA_RS_SIGN_PRIMEQ_SIZE_IN_BYTES != primeQSizeInBytes) {
+		APRINTK("%s(): DSA PRIME Q size not equal to the "
+			"FIPS defined 20bytes, = %d\n",
+			__FUNCTION__, primeQSizeInBytes);
+		krp->krp_status = EDOM;
+		return EDOM;
+	}
+
+	dsaRsSignOpData = kmem_cache_zalloc(drvDSARSSign_zone, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (NULL == dsaRsSignOpData) {
+		APRINTK("%s():Failed to get memory"
+			" for DSA RS Sign Op data struct\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		krp->krp_status = ENOMEM;
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	dsaRsSignOpData->K.pData =
+	    kmem_cache_alloc(drvDSARSSignKValue_zone, GFP_ATOMIC);
+
+	if (NULL == dsaRsSignOpData->K.pData) {
+		APRINTK("%s():Failed to get memory"
+			" for DSA RS Sign Op Random value\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		kmem_cache_free(drvDSARSSign_zone, dsaRsSignOpData);
+		krp->krp_status = ENOMEM;
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	pR = kmem_cache_zalloc(drvFlatBuffer_zone, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (NULL == pR) {
+		APRINTK("%s():Failed to get memory"
+			" for DSA signature R\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		kmem_cache_free(drvDSARSSignKValue_zone,
+				dsaRsSignOpData->K.pData);
+		kmem_cache_free(drvDSARSSign_zone, dsaRsSignOpData);
+		krp->krp_status = ENOMEM;
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	pS = kmem_cache_zalloc(drvFlatBuffer_zone, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (NULL == pS) {
+		APRINTK("%s():Failed to get memory"
+			" for DSA signature S\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		icp_ocfDrvFreeFlatBuffer(pR);
+		kmem_cache_free(drvDSARSSignKValue_zone,
+				dsaRsSignOpData->K.pData);
+		kmem_cache_free(drvDSARSSign_zone, dsaRsSignOpData);
+		krp->krp_status = ENOMEM;
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	/*link prime number parameter for ease of processing */
+	dsaRsSignOpData->P.pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_SIGN_KRP_PARAM_PRIME_P_INDEX].crp_p;
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(dsaRsSignOpData->P.dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_SIGN_KRP_PARAM_PRIME_P_INDEX].
+		      crp_nbits);
+
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(dsaRsSignOpData->P.pData,
+			    dsaRsSignOpData->P.dataLenInBytes);
+
+	dsaRsSignOpData->Q.pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_SIGN_KRP_PARAM_PRIME_Q_INDEX].crp_p;
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(dsaRsSignOpData->Q.dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_SIGN_KRP_PARAM_PRIME_Q_INDEX].
+		      crp_nbits);
+
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(dsaRsSignOpData->Q.pData,
+			    dsaRsSignOpData->Q.dataLenInBytes);
+
+	/*generate random number with equal buffer size to Prime value Q,
+	   but value less than Q */
+	dsaRsSignOpData->K.dataLenInBytes = dsaRsSignOpData->Q.dataLenInBytes;
+
+	randGenOpData.generateBits = CPA_TRUE;
+	randGenOpData.lenInBytes = dsaRsSignOpData->K.dataLenInBytes;
+
+	icp_ocfDrvPtrAndLenToFlatBuffer(dsaRsSignOpData->K.pData,
+					dsaRsSignOpData->K.dataLenInBytes,
+					&randData);
+
+	doCheck = 0;
+	while (icp_ocfDrvCheckALessThanB(&(dsaRsSignOpData->K),
+					 &(dsaRsSignOpData->Q), &doCheck)) {
+
+		if (CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS
+		    != cpaCyRandGen(CPA_INSTANCE_HANDLE_SINGLE,
+				    NULL, NULL, &randGenOpData, &randData)) {
+			APRINTK("%s(): ERROR - Failed to generate DSA RS Sign K"
+				"value\n", __FUNCTION__);
+			icp_ocfDrvFreeFlatBuffer(pS);
+			icp_ocfDrvFreeFlatBuffer(pR);
+			kmem_cache_free(drvDSARSSignKValue_zone,
+					dsaRsSignOpData->K.pData);
+			kmem_cache_free(drvDSARSSign_zone, dsaRsSignOpData);
+			krp->krp_status = EAGAIN;
+			return EAGAIN;
+		}
+
+		doCheck++;
+		if (DSA_SIGN_RAND_GEN_VAL_CHECK_MAX_ITERATIONS == doCheck) {
+			APRINTK("%s(): ERROR - Failed to find DSA RS Sign K "
+				"value less than Q value\n", __FUNCTION__);
+			icp_ocfDrvFreeFlatBuffer(pS);
+			icp_ocfDrvFreeFlatBuffer(pR);
+			kmem_cache_free(drvDSARSSignKValue_zone,
+					dsaRsSignOpData->K.pData);
+			kmem_cache_free(drvDSARSSign_zone, dsaRsSignOpData);
+			krp->krp_status = EAGAIN;
+			return EAGAIN;
+		}
+
+	}
+	/*Rand Data - no need to swap bytes for pK */
+
+	/* Link parameters */
+	dsaRsSignOpData->G.pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_SIGN_KRP_PARAM_G_INDEX].crp_p;
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(dsaRsSignOpData->G.dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_SIGN_KRP_PARAM_G_INDEX].crp_nbits);
+
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(dsaRsSignOpData->G.pData,
+			    dsaRsSignOpData->G.dataLenInBytes);
+
+	dsaRsSignOpData->X.pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_SIGN_KRP_PARAM_X_INDEX].crp_p;
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(dsaRsSignOpData->X.dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_SIGN_KRP_PARAM_X_INDEX].crp_nbits);
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(dsaRsSignOpData->X.pData,
+			    dsaRsSignOpData->X.dataLenInBytes);
+
+	dsaRsSignOpData->M.pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_SIGN_KRP_PARAM_DGST_INDEX].crp_p;
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(dsaRsSignOpData->M.dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_SIGN_KRP_PARAM_DGST_INDEX].
+		      crp_nbits);
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(dsaRsSignOpData->M.pData,
+			    dsaRsSignOpData->M.dataLenInBytes);
+
+	/* Output Parameters */
+	pS->pData = krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_SIGN_KRP_PARAM_S_RESULT_INDEX].crp_p;
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(pS->dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_SIGN_KRP_PARAM_S_RESULT_INDEX].
+		      crp_nbits);
+
+	pR->pData = krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_SIGN_KRP_PARAM_R_RESULT_INDEX].crp_p;
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(pR->dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_SIGN_KRP_PARAM_R_RESULT_INDEX].
+		      crp_nbits);
+
+	lacStatus = cpaCyDsaSignRS(CPA_INSTANCE_HANDLE_SINGLE,
+				   icp_ocfDrvDsaRSSignCallBack,
+				   callbackTag, dsaRsSignOpData,
+				   &protocolStatus, pR, pS);
+
+	if (CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS != lacStatus) {
+		EPRINTK("%s(): DSA RS Sign Operation failed (%d).\n",
+			__FUNCTION__, lacStatus);
+		krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+		icp_ocfDrvFreeFlatBuffer(pS);
+		icp_ocfDrvFreeFlatBuffer(pR);
+		kmem_cache_free(drvDSARSSignKValue_zone,
+				dsaRsSignOpData->K.pData);
+		kmem_cache_free(drvDSARSSign_zone, dsaRsSignOpData);
+	}
+
+	return lacStatus;
+}
+
+/* Name        : icp_ocfDrvDsaVerify
+ *
+ * Description : This function will map DSA RS Verify from OCF to the LAC API.
+ *
+ */
+static int icp_ocfDrvDsaVerify(struct cryptkop *krp)
+{
+	CpaStatus lacStatus = CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+	CpaCyDsaVerifyOpData *dsaVerifyOpData = NULL;
+	void *callbackTag = NULL;
+	CpaBoolean verifyStatus = CPA_FALSE;
+
+	callbackTag = krp;
+
+	dsaVerifyOpData = kmem_cache_zalloc(drvDSAVerify_zone, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (NULL == dsaVerifyOpData) {
+		APRINTK("%s():Failed to get memory"
+			" for DSA Verify Op data struct\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		krp->krp_status = ENOMEM;
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	/* Link parameters */
+	dsaVerifyOpData->P.pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_VERIFY_KRP_PARAM_PRIME_P_INDEX].crp_p;
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(dsaVerifyOpData->P.dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_VERIFY_KRP_PARAM_PRIME_P_INDEX].
+		      crp_nbits);
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(dsaVerifyOpData->P.pData,
+			    dsaVerifyOpData->P.dataLenInBytes);
+
+	dsaVerifyOpData->Q.pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_VERIFY_KRP_PARAM_PRIME_Q_INDEX].crp_p;
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(dsaVerifyOpData->Q.dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_VERIFY_KRP_PARAM_PRIME_Q_INDEX].
+		      crp_nbits);
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(dsaVerifyOpData->Q.pData,
+			    dsaVerifyOpData->Q.dataLenInBytes);
+
+	dsaVerifyOpData->G.pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_VERIFY_KRP_PARAM_G_INDEX].crp_p;
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(dsaVerifyOpData->G.dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_VERIFY_KRP_PARAM_G_INDEX].
+		      crp_nbits);
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(dsaVerifyOpData->G.pData,
+			    dsaVerifyOpData->G.dataLenInBytes);
+
+	dsaVerifyOpData->Y.pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_VERIFY_KRP_PARAM_PUBKEY_INDEX].crp_p;
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(dsaVerifyOpData->Y.dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_VERIFY_KRP_PARAM_PUBKEY_INDEX].
+		      crp_nbits);
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(dsaVerifyOpData->Y.pData,
+			    dsaVerifyOpData->Y.dataLenInBytes);
+
+	dsaVerifyOpData->M.pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_VERIFY_KRP_PARAM_DGST_INDEX].crp_p;
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(dsaVerifyOpData->M.dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_VERIFY_KRP_PARAM_DGST_INDEX].
+		      crp_nbits);
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(dsaVerifyOpData->M.pData,
+			    dsaVerifyOpData->M.dataLenInBytes);
+
+	dsaVerifyOpData->R.pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_VERIFY_KRP_PARAM_SIG_R_INDEX].crp_p;
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(dsaVerifyOpData->R.dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_VERIFY_KRP_PARAM_SIG_R_INDEX].
+		      crp_nbits);
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(dsaVerifyOpData->R.pData,
+			    dsaVerifyOpData->R.dataLenInBytes);
+
+	dsaVerifyOpData->S.pData =
+	    krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_VERIFY_KRP_PARAM_SIG_S_INDEX].crp_p;
+	BITS_TO_BYTES(dsaVerifyOpData->S.dataLenInBytes,
+		      krp->krp_param[ICP_DSA_VERIFY_KRP_PARAM_SIG_S_INDEX].
+		      crp_nbits);
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(dsaVerifyOpData->S.pData,
+			    dsaVerifyOpData->S.dataLenInBytes);
+
+	lacStatus = cpaCyDsaVerify(CPA_INSTANCE_HANDLE_SINGLE,
+				   icp_ocfDrvDsaVerifyCallBack,
+				   callbackTag, dsaVerifyOpData, &verifyStatus);
+
+	if (CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS != lacStatus) {
+		EPRINTK("%s(): DSA Verify Operation failed (%d).\n",
+			__FUNCTION__, lacStatus);
+		kmem_cache_free(drvDSAVerify_zone, dsaVerifyOpData);
+		krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+	}
+
+	return lacStatus;
+}
+
+/* Name        : icp_ocfDrvReadRandom
+ *
+ * Description : This function will map RNG functionality calls from OCF
+ * to the LAC API.
+ */
+int icp_ocfDrvReadRandom(void *arg, uint32_t * buf, int maxwords)
+{
+	CpaStatus lacStatus = CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+	CpaCyRandGenOpData randGenOpData;
+	CpaFlatBuffer randData;
+
+	if (NULL == buf) {
+		APRINTK("%s(): Invalid input parameters\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		return EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* maxwords here is number of integers to generate data for */
+	randGenOpData.generateBits = CPA_TRUE;
+
+	randGenOpData.lenInBytes = maxwords * sizeof(uint32_t);
+
+	icp_ocfDrvPtrAndLenToFlatBuffer((Cpa8U *) buf,
+					randGenOpData.lenInBytes, &randData);
+
+	lacStatus = cpaCyRandGen(CPA_INSTANCE_HANDLE_SINGLE,
+				 NULL, NULL, &randGenOpData, &randData);
+	if (CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS != lacStatus) {
+		EPRINTK("%s(): icp_LacSymRandGen failed (%d). \n",
+			__FUNCTION__, lacStatus);
+		return RETURN_RAND_NUM_GEN_FAILED;
+	}
+
+	return randGenOpData.lenInBytes / sizeof(uint32_t);
+}
+
+/* Name        : icp_ocfDrvDhP1Callback
+ *
+ * Description : When this function returns it signifies that the LAC
+ * component has completed the DH operation.
+ */
+static void
+icp_ocfDrvDhP1CallBack(void *callbackTag,
+		       CpaStatus status,
+		       void *pOpData, CpaFlatBuffer * pLocalOctetStringPV)
+{
+	struct cryptkop *krp = NULL;
+	CpaCyDhPhase1KeyGenOpData *pPhase1OpData = NULL;
+
+	if (NULL == callbackTag) {
+		DPRINTK("%s(): Invalid input parameters - "
+			"callbackTag data is NULL\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		return;
+	}
+	krp = (struct cryptkop *)callbackTag;
+
+	if (NULL == pOpData) {
+		DPRINTK("%s(): Invalid input parameters - "
+			"Operation Data is NULL\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+		crypto_kdone(krp);
+		return;
+	}
+	pPhase1OpData = (CpaCyDhPhase1KeyGenOpData *) pOpData;
+
+	if (NULL == pLocalOctetStringPV) {
+		DPRINTK("%s(): Invalid input parameters - "
+			"pLocalOctetStringPV Data is NULL\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		memset(pPhase1OpData, 0, sizeof(CpaCyDhPhase1KeyGenOpData));
+		kmem_cache_free(drvDH_zone, pPhase1OpData);
+		krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+		crypto_kdone(krp);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS == status) {
+		krp->krp_status = CRYPTO_OP_SUCCESS;
+	} else {
+		APRINTK("%s(): Diffie Hellman Phase1 Key Gen failed - "
+			"Operation Status = %d\n", __FUNCTION__, status);
+		krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+	}
+
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(pLocalOctetStringPV->pData,
+			    pLocalOctetStringPV->dataLenInBytes);
+
+	icp_ocfDrvFreeFlatBuffer(pLocalOctetStringPV);
+	memset(pPhase1OpData, 0, sizeof(CpaCyDhPhase1KeyGenOpData));
+	kmem_cache_free(drvDH_zone, pPhase1OpData);
+
+	crypto_kdone(krp);
+
+	return;
+}
+
+/* Name        : icp_ocfDrvModExpCallBack
+ *
+ * Description : When this function returns it signifies that the LAC
+ * component has completed the Mod Exp operation.
+ */
+static void
+icp_ocfDrvModExpCallBack(void *callbackTag,
+			 CpaStatus status,
+			 void *pOpdata, CpaFlatBuffer * pResult)
+{
+	struct cryptkop *krp = NULL;
+	CpaCyLnModExpOpData *pLnModExpOpData = NULL;
+
+	if (NULL == callbackTag) {
+		DPRINTK("%s(): Invalid input parameters - "
+			"callbackTag data is NULL\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		return;
+	}
+	krp = (struct cryptkop *)callbackTag;
+
+	if (NULL == pOpdata) {
+		DPRINTK("%s(): Invalid Mod Exp input parameters - "
+			"Operation Data is NULL\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+		crypto_kdone(krp);
+		return;
+	}
+	pLnModExpOpData = (CpaCyLnModExpOpData *) pOpdata;
+
+	if (NULL == pResult) {
+		DPRINTK("%s(): Invalid input parameters - "
+			"pResult data is NULL\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+		memset(pLnModExpOpData, 0, sizeof(CpaCyLnModExpOpData));
+		kmem_cache_free(drvLnModExp_zone, pLnModExpOpData);
+		crypto_kdone(krp);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS == status) {
+		krp->krp_status = CRYPTO_OP_SUCCESS;
+	} else {
+		APRINTK("%s(): LAC Mod Exp Operation failed - "
+			"Operation Status = %d\n", __FUNCTION__, status);
+		krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+	}
+
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(pResult->pData, pResult->dataLenInBytes);
+
+	/*switch base size value back to original */
+	if (pLnModExpOpData->base.pData ==
+	    (uint8_t *) & (krp->
+			   krp_param[ICP_MOD_EXP_KRP_PARAM_BASE_INDEX].
+			   crp_nbits)) {
+		*((uint32_t *) pLnModExpOpData->base.pData) =
+		    ntohl(*((uint32_t *) pLnModExpOpData->base.pData));
+	}
+	icp_ocfDrvFreeFlatBuffer(pResult);
+	memset(pLnModExpOpData, 0, sizeof(CpaCyLnModExpOpData));
+	kmem_cache_free(drvLnModExp_zone, pLnModExpOpData);
+
+	crypto_kdone(krp);
+
+	return;
+
+}
+
+/* Name        : icp_ocfDrvModExpCRTCallBack
+ *
+ * Description : When this function returns it signifies that the LAC
+ * component has completed the Mod Exp CRT operation.
+ */
+static void
+icp_ocfDrvModExpCRTCallBack(void *callbackTag,
+			    CpaStatus status,
+			    void *pOpData, CpaFlatBuffer * pOutputData)
+{
+	struct cryptkop *krp = NULL;
+	CpaCyRsaDecryptOpData *pDecryptData = NULL;
+
+	if (NULL == callbackTag) {
+		DPRINTK("%s(): Invalid input parameters - "
+			"callbackTag data is NULL\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	krp = (struct cryptkop *)callbackTag;
+
+	if (NULL == pOpData) {
+		DPRINTK("%s(): Invalid input parameters - "
+			"Operation Data is NULL\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+		crypto_kdone(krp);
+		return;
+	}
+	pDecryptData = (CpaCyRsaDecryptOpData *) pOpData;
+
+	if (NULL == pOutputData) {
+		DPRINTK("%s(): Invalid input parameter - "
+			"pOutputData is NULL\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		memset(pDecryptData->pRecipientPrivateKey, 0,
+		       sizeof(CpaCyRsaPrivateKey));
+		kmem_cache_free(drvRSAPrivateKey_zone,
+				pDecryptData->pRecipientPrivateKey);
+		memset(pDecryptData, 0, sizeof(CpaCyRsaDecryptOpData));
+		kmem_cache_free(drvRSADecrypt_zone, pDecryptData);
+		krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+		crypto_kdone(krp);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS == status) {
+		krp->krp_status = CRYPTO_OP_SUCCESS;
+	} else {
+		APRINTK("%s(): LAC Mod Exp CRT operation failed - "
+			"Operation Status = %d\n", __FUNCTION__, status);
+		krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+	}
+
+	icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(pOutputData->pData, pOutputData->dataLenInBytes);
+
+	icp_ocfDrvFreeFlatBuffer(pOutputData);
+	memset(pDecryptData->pRecipientPrivateKey, 0,
+	       sizeof(CpaCyRsaPrivateKey));
+	kmem_cache_free(drvRSAPrivateKey_zone,
+			pDecryptData->pRecipientPrivateKey);
+	memset(pDecryptData, 0, sizeof(CpaCyRsaDecryptOpData));
+	kmem_cache_free(drvRSADecrypt_zone, pDecryptData);
+
+	crypto_kdone(krp);
+
+	return;
+}
+
+/* Name        : icp_ocfDrvDsaRSSignCallBack
+ *
+ * Description : When this function returns it signifies that the LAC
+ * component has completed the DSA RS sign operation.
+ */
+static void
+icp_ocfDrvDsaRSSignCallBack(void *callbackTag,
+			    CpaStatus status,
+			    void *pOpData,
+			    CpaBoolean protocolStatus,
+			    CpaFlatBuffer * pR, CpaFlatBuffer * pS)
+{
+	struct cryptkop *krp = NULL;
+	CpaCyDsaRSSignOpData *pSignData = NULL;
+
+	if (NULL == callbackTag) {
+		DPRINTK("%s(): Invalid input parameters - "
+			"callbackTag data is NULL\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	krp = (struct cryptkop *)callbackTag;
+
+	if (NULL == pOpData) {
+		DPRINTK("%s(): Invalid input parameters - "
+			"Operation Data is NULL\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+		crypto_kdone(krp);
+		return;
+	}
+	pSignData = (CpaCyDsaRSSignOpData *) pOpData;
+
+	if (NULL == pR) {
+		DPRINTK("%s(): Invalid input parameter - "
+			"pR sign is NULL\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		icp_ocfDrvFreeFlatBuffer(pS);
+		kmem_cache_free(drvDSARSSign_zone, pSignData);
+		krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+		crypto_kdone(krp);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (NULL == pS) {
+		DPRINTK("%s(): Invalid input parameter - "
+			"pS sign is NULL\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		icp_ocfDrvFreeFlatBuffer(pR);
+		kmem_cache_free(drvDSARSSign_zone, pSignData);
+		krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+		crypto_kdone(krp);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS != status) {
+		APRINTK("%s(): LAC DSA RS Sign operation failed - "
+			"Operation Status = %d\n", __FUNCTION__, status);
+		krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+	} else {
+		krp->krp_status = CRYPTO_OP_SUCCESS;
+
+		if (CPA_TRUE != protocolStatus) {
+			DPRINTK("%s(): LAC DSA RS Sign operation failed due "
+				"to protocol error\n", __FUNCTION__);
+			krp->krp_status = EIO;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Swap bytes only when the callback status is successful and
+	   protocolStatus is set to true */
+	if (CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS == status && CPA_TRUE == protocolStatus) {
+		icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(pR->pData, pR->dataLenInBytes);
+		icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(pS->pData, pS->dataLenInBytes);
+	}
+
+	icp_ocfDrvFreeFlatBuffer(pR);
+	icp_ocfDrvFreeFlatBuffer(pS);
+	memset(pSignData->K.pData, 0, pSignData->K.dataLenInBytes);
+	kmem_cache_free(drvDSARSSignKValue_zone, pSignData->K.pData);
+	memset(pSignData, 0, sizeof(CpaCyDsaRSSignOpData));
+	kmem_cache_free(drvDSARSSign_zone, pSignData);
+	crypto_kdone(krp);
+
+	return;
+}
+
+/* Name        : icp_ocfDrvDsaVerifyCallback
+ *
+ * Description : When this function returns it signifies that the LAC
+ * component has completed the DSA Verify operation.
+ */
+static void
+icp_ocfDrvDsaVerifyCallBack(void *callbackTag,
+			    CpaStatus status,
+			    void *pOpData, CpaBoolean verifyStatus)
+{
+
+	struct cryptkop *krp = NULL;
+	CpaCyDsaVerifyOpData *pVerData = NULL;
+
+	if (NULL == callbackTag) {
+		DPRINTK("%s(): Invalid input parameters - "
+			"callbackTag data is NULL\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	krp = (struct cryptkop *)callbackTag;
+
+	if (NULL == pOpData) {
+		DPRINTK("%s(): Invalid input parameters - "
+			"Operation Data is NULL\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+		crypto_kdone(krp);
+		return;
+	}
+	pVerData = (CpaCyDsaVerifyOpData *) pOpData;
+
+	if (CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS != status) {
+		APRINTK("%s(): LAC DSA Verify operation failed - "
+			"Operation Status = %d\n", __FUNCTION__, status);
+		krp->krp_status = ECANCELED;
+	} else {
+		krp->krp_status = CRYPTO_OP_SUCCESS;
+
+		if (CPA_TRUE != verifyStatus) {
+			DPRINTK("%s(): DSA signature invalid\n", __FUNCTION__);
+			krp->krp_status = EIO;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Swap bytes only when the callback status is successful and
+	   verifyStatus is set to true */
+	/*Just swapping back the key values for now. Possibly all
+	   swapped buffers need to be reverted */
+	if (CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS == status && CPA_TRUE == verifyStatus) {
+		icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(pVerData->R.pData,
+				    pVerData->R.dataLenInBytes);
+		icp_ocfDrvSwapBytes(pVerData->S.pData,
+				    pVerData->S.dataLenInBytes);
+	}
+
+	memset(pVerData, 0, sizeof(CpaCyDsaVerifyOpData));
+	kmem_cache_free(drvDSAVerify_zone, pVerData);
+	crypto_kdone(krp);
+
+	return;
+}