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authornbd <nbd@3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73>2006-12-09 21:38:50 +0000
committernbd <nbd@3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73>2006-12-09 21:38:50 +0000
commit87ab1e6c667e4467edeed0ef82f6278068aad05a (patch)
tree8a10405cab5ef05f5246f2d7be6a8a7904fdc866 /package
parent3319f184b2c4c80aa1ea5e2789c50687ad3b4200 (diff)
fix file encoding of madwifi security patch (trac gave me CRLF)
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/trunk@5744 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
Diffstat (limited to 'package')
-rw-r--r--package/madwifi/patches/105-security_patch_fix.patch54
1 files changed, 27 insertions, 27 deletions
diff --git a/package/madwifi/patches/105-security_patch_fix.patch b/package/madwifi/patches/105-security_patch_fix.patch
index df0ea4d496..96dc17ac60 100644
--- a/package/madwifi/patches/105-security_patch_fix.patch
+++ b/package/madwifi/patches/105-security_patch_fix.patch
@@ -1,27 +1,27 @@
-The fix for CVE-2006-6332 in r1842 was not entirely correct. In
-encode_ie() the bound check did not consider that each byte from
-the IE causes two bytes to be written into buffer. That could
-lead to a kernel oops, but does not allow code injection. This is
-now fixed.
-
-Due to the type of this problem it does not trigger another
-urgent security bugfix release. v0.9.3 is at the door anyway.
-
-Reported-by: Joachim Gleisner <jg@suse.de>
-
-Index: trunk/net80211/ieee80211_wireless.c
-===================================================================
---- trunk/net80211/ieee80211_wireless.c (revision 1846)
-+++ trunk/net80211/ieee80211_wireless.c (revision 1847)
-@@ -1566,8 +1566,8 @@
- bufsize -= leader_len;
- p += leader_len;
-- if (bufsize < ielen)
-- return 0;
-- for (i = 0; i < ielen && bufsize > 2; i++)
-+ for (i = 0; i < ielen && bufsize > 2; i++) {
- p += sprintf(p, "%02x", ie[i]);
-+ bufsize -= 2;
-+ }
- return (i == ielen ? p - (u_int8_t *)buf : 0);
- }
+The fix for CVE-2006-6332 in r1842 was not entirely correct. In
+encode_ie() the bound check did not consider that each byte from
+the IE causes two bytes to be written into buffer. That could
+lead to a kernel oops, but does not allow code injection. This is
+now fixed.
+
+Due to the type of this problem it does not trigger another
+urgent security bugfix release. v0.9.3 is at the door anyway.
+
+Reported-by: Joachim Gleisner <jg@suse.de>
+
+Index: trunk/net80211/ieee80211_wireless.c
+===================================================================
+--- trunk/net80211/ieee80211_wireless.c (revision 1846)
++++ trunk/net80211/ieee80211_wireless.c (revision 1847)
+@@ -1566,8 +1566,8 @@
+ bufsize -= leader_len;
+ p += leader_len;
+- if (bufsize < ielen)
+- return 0;
+- for (i = 0; i < ielen && bufsize > 2; i++)
++ for (i = 0; i < ielen && bufsize > 2; i++) {
+ p += sprintf(p, "%02x", ie[i]);
++ bufsize -= 2;
++ }
+ return (i == ielen ? p - (u_int8_t *)buf : 0);
+ }