add the 'ead' package (emergency access daemon),

which can provide remote access to your device, even if the ip
and firewall settings are broken

git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/trunk@13738 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73

1 files changed, 338 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/package/ead/src/tinysrp/t_misc.c b/package/ead/src/tinysrp/t_misc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a23986f90f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/ead/src/tinysrp/t_misc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1997-1999  The Stanford SRP Authentication Project
+ * All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS-IS" AND WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR OTHERWISE, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY
+ * WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+ *
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL STANFORD BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL,
+ * INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OF ANY KIND, OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER
+ * RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER OR NOT ADVISED OF
+ * THE POSSIBILITY OF DAMAGE, AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, ARISING OUT
+ * OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * In addition, the following conditions apply:
+ *
+ * 1. Any software that incorporates the SRP authentication technology
+ *    must display the following acknowlegment:
+ *    "This product uses the 'Secure Remote Password' cryptographic
+ *     authentication system developed by Tom Wu (tjw@CS.Stanford.EDU)."
+ *
+ * 2. Any software that incorporates all or part of the SRP distribution
+ *    itself must also display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by Tom Wu and Eugene
+ *     Jhong for the SRP Distribution (http://srp.stanford.edu/srp/)."
+ *
+ * 3. Redistributions in source or binary form must retain an intact copy
+ *    of this copyright notice and list of conditions.
+ */
+
+#include "t_defines.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+
+#include "t_sha.h"
+
+#ifndef NULL
+#define NULL 0
+#endif
+
+static unsigned char randpool[SHA_DIGESTSIZE], randout[SHA_DIGESTSIZE];
+static unsigned long randcnt = 0;
+static unsigned int outpos = 0;
+SHA1_CTX randctxt;
+
+/*
+ * t_envhash - Generate a 160-bit SHA hash of the environment
+ *
+ * This routine performs an SHA hash of all the "name=value" pairs
+ * in the environment concatenated together and dumps them in the
+ * output.  While it is true that anyone on the system can see
+ * your environment, someone not on the system will have a very
+ * difficult time guessing it, especially since some systems play
+ * tricks with variable ordering and sometimes define quirky
+ * environment variables like $WINDOWID or $_.
+ */
+extern char ** environ;
+
+static void
+t_envhash(out)
+     unsigned char * out;
+{
+  char ** ptr;
+  char ebuf[256];
+  SHA1_CTX ctxt;
+
+  SHA1Init(&ctxt);
+  for(ptr = environ; *ptr; ++ptr) {
+    strncpy(ebuf, *ptr, 255);
+    ebuf[255] = '\0';
+    SHA1Update(&ctxt, ebuf, strlen(ebuf));
+  }
+  SHA1Final(out, &ctxt);
+}
+
+/*
+ * t_fshash - Generate a 160-bit SHA hash from the file system
+ *
+ * This routine climbs up the directory tree from the current
+ * directory, running stat() on each directory until it hits the
+ * root directory.  This information is sensitive to the last
+ * access/modification times of all the directories above you,
+ * so someone who lists one of those directories injects some
+ * entropy into the system.  Obviously, this hash is very sensitive
+ * to your current directory when the program is run.
+ *
+ * For good measure, it also performs an fstat on the standard input,
+ * usually your tty, throws that into the buffer, creates a file in
+ * /tmp (the inode is unpredictable on a busy system), and runs stat()
+ * on that before deleting it.
+ *
+ * The entire buffer is run once through SHA to obtain the final result.
+ */
+static void
+t_fshash(out)
+     unsigned char * out;
+{
+  char dotpath[128];
+  struct stat st;
+  SHA1_CTX ctxt;
+  int i, pinode;
+  dev_t pdev;
+
+  SHA1Init(&ctxt);
+  if(stat(".", &st) >= 0) {
+    SHA1Update(&ctxt, (unsigned char *) &st, sizeof(st));
+    pinode = st.st_ino;
+    pdev = st.st_dev;
+    strcpy(dotpath, "..");
+    for(i = 0; i < 40; ++i) {
+      if(stat(dotpath, &st) < 0)
+	break;
+      if(st.st_ino == pinode && st.st_dev == pdev)
+	break;
+      SHA1Update(&ctxt, (unsigned char *) &st, sizeof(st));
+      pinode = st.st_ino;
+      pdev = st.st_dev;
+      strcat(dotpath, "/..");
+    }
+  }
+
+  if(fstat(0, &st) >= 0)
+    SHA1Update(&ctxt, (unsigned char *) &st, sizeof(st));
+
+  sprintf(dotpath, "/tmp/rnd.%d", getpid());
+  if(creat(dotpath, 0600) >= 0 && stat(dotpath, &st) >= 0)
+    SHA1Update(&ctxt, (unsigned char *) &st, sizeof(st));
+  unlink(dotpath);
+
+  SHA1Final(out, &ctxt);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate a high-entropy seed for the strong random number generator.
+ * This uses a wide variety of quickly gathered and somewhat unpredictable
+ * system information.  The 'preseed' structure is assembled from:
+ *
+ *   The system time in seconds
+ *   The system time in microseconds
+ *   The current process ID
+ *   The parent process ID
+ *   A hash of the user's environment
+ *   A hash gathered from the file system
+ *   Input from a random device, if available
+ *   Timings of system interrupts
+ *
+ * The entire structure (60 bytes on most systems) is fed to SHA to produce
+ * a 160-bit seed for the strong random number generator.  It is believed
+ * that in the worst case (on a quiet system with no random device versus
+ * an attacker who has access to the system already), the seed contains at
+ * least about 80 bits of entropy.  Versus an attacker who does not have
+ * access to the system, the entropy should be slightly over 128 bits.
+ */
+static char initialized = 0;
+
+static struct {
+  unsigned int trand1;
+  time_t sec;
+  time_t usec;
+  short pid;
+  short ppid;
+  unsigned char envh[SHA_DIGESTSIZE];
+  unsigned char fsh[SHA_DIGESTSIZE];
+  unsigned char devrand[20];
+  unsigned int trand2;
+} preseed;
+
+unsigned long raw_truerand();
+
+void
+t_initrand()
+{
+  SHA1_CTX ctxt;
+#ifdef USE_FTIME
+  struct timeb t;
+#else
+  struct timeval t;
+#endif
+  int i, r=0;
+
+  if(initialized)
+    return;
+
+  initialized = 1;
+
+  i = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
+  if(i > 0) {
+    r += read(i, preseed.devrand, sizeof(preseed.devrand));
+    close(i);
+  }
+
+  /* Resort to truerand only if desperate for some Real entropy */
+  if(r == 0)
+    preseed.trand1 = raw_truerand();
+
+#ifdef USE_FTIME
+  ftime(&t);
+#else
+  gettimeofday(&t, NULL);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_FTIME
+  preseed.sec = t.time;
+  preseed.usec = t.millitm;
+#else
+  preseed.sec = t.tv_sec;
+  preseed.usec = t.tv_usec;
+#endif
+  preseed.pid = getpid();
+  preseed.ppid = getppid();
+  t_envhash(preseed.envh);
+  t_fshash(preseed.fsh);
+
+  if(r == 0)
+    preseed.trand2 = raw_truerand();
+
+  SHA1Init(&ctxt);
+  SHA1Update(&ctxt, (unsigned char *) &preseed, sizeof(preseed));
+  SHA1Final(randpool, &ctxt);
+  outpos = 0;
+  memset((unsigned char *) &preseed, 0, sizeof(preseed));
+  memset((unsigned char *) &ctxt, 0, sizeof(ctxt));
+}
+
+#define NUM_RANDOMS 12
+
+/*
+ * The strong random number generator.  This uses a 160-bit seed
+ * and uses SHA-1 in a feedback configuration to generate successive
+ * outputs.  If S[0] is set to the initial seed, then:
+ *
+ *         S[i+1] = SHA-1(i || S[i])
+ *         A[i] = SHA-1(S[i])
+ *
+ * where the A[i] are the output blocks starting with i=0.
+ * Each cycle generates 20 bytes of new output.
+ */
+_TYPE( void )
+t_random(data, size)
+     unsigned char * data;
+     unsigned size;
+{
+  if(!initialized)
+    t_initrand();
+
+  if(size <= 0)         /* t_random(NULL, 0) forces seed initialization */
+    return;
+
+  while(size > outpos) {
+    if(outpos > 0) {
+      memcpy(data, randout + (sizeof(randout) - outpos), outpos);
+      data += outpos;
+      size -= outpos;
+    }
+
+    /* Recycle */
+    SHA1Init(&randctxt);
+    SHA1Update(&randctxt, randpool, sizeof(randpool));
+    SHA1Final(randout, &randctxt);
+    SHA1Init(&randctxt);
+    SHA1Update(&randctxt, (unsigned char *) &randcnt, sizeof(randcnt));
+    SHA1Update(&randctxt, randpool, sizeof(randpool));
+    SHA1Final(randpool, &randctxt);
+    ++randcnt;
+    outpos = sizeof(randout);
+  }
+
+  if(size > 0) {
+    memcpy(data, randout + (sizeof(randout) - outpos), size);
+    outpos -= size;
+  }
+}
+
+/*
+ * The interleaved session-key hash.  This separates the even and the odd
+ * bytes of the input (ignoring the first byte if the input length is odd),
+ * hashes them separately, and re-interleaves the two outputs to form a
+ * single 320-bit value.
+ */
+_TYPE( unsigned char * )
+t_sessionkey(key, sk, sklen)
+     unsigned char * key;
+     unsigned char * sk;
+     unsigned sklen;
+{
+  unsigned i, klen;
+  unsigned char * hbuf;
+  unsigned char hout[SHA_DIGESTSIZE];
+  SHA1_CTX ctxt;
+
+  while(sklen > 0 && *sk == 0) {        /* Skip leading 0's */
+    --sklen;
+    ++sk;
+  }
+
+  klen = sklen / 2;
+  if((hbuf = malloc(klen * sizeof(char))) == 0)
+    return 0;
+
+  for(i = 0; i < klen; ++i)
+    hbuf[i] = sk[sklen - 2 * i - 1];
+  SHA1Init(&ctxt);
+  SHA1Update(&ctxt, hbuf, klen);
+  SHA1Final(hout, &ctxt);
+  for(i = 0; i < sizeof(hout); ++i)
+    key[2 * i] = hout[i];
+
+  for(i = 0; i < klen; ++i)
+    hbuf[i] = sk[sklen - 2 * i - 2];
+  SHA1Init(&ctxt);
+  SHA1Update(&ctxt, hbuf, klen);
+  SHA1Final(hout, &ctxt);
+  for(i = 0; i < sizeof(hout); ++i)
+    key[2 * i + 1] = hout[i];
+
+  memset(hout, 0, sizeof(hout));
+  memset(hbuf, 0, klen);
+  free(hbuf);
+  return key;
+}