core.s2smanager, mod_console, mod_saslauth, util.certverification: rename util.certve...
authorKim Alvefur <zash@zash.se>
Sun, 12 Dec 2010 01:03:32 +0000 (02:03 +0100)
committerKim Alvefur <zash@zash.se>
Sun, 12 Dec 2010 01:03:32 +0000 (02:03 +0100)
core/s2smanager.lua
plugins/mod_console.lua
plugins/mod_saslauth.lua
util/certverification.lua [deleted file]
util/x509.lua [new file with mode: 0644]

index 0990a0aae327c14bde22500e1e57955295bd2626..2f6c847891776414a7974330c847aacb59caaa2b 100644 (file)
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ local modulemanager = require "core.modulemanager";
 local st = require "stanza";
 local stanza = st.stanza;
 local nameprep = require "util.encodings".stringprep.nameprep;
-local cert_verify_identity = require "util.certverification".verify_identity;
+local cert_verify_identity = require "util.x509".verify_identity;
 
 local fire_event = prosody.events.fire_event;
 local uuid_gen = require "util.uuid".generate;
index 0b2dd5f8914224b4389f3a8d69ac94330572c73f..da40f57e0a675b871108e19dc7007da15c8003e8 100644 (file)
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ local console_listener = { default_port = 5582; default_mode = "*l"; default_int
 require "util.iterators";
 local jid_bare = require "util.jid".bare;
 local set, array = require "util.set", require "util.array";
-local cert_verify_identity = require "util.certverification".verify_identity;
+local cert_verify_identity = require "util.x509".verify_identity;
 
 local commands = {};
 local def_env = {};
index 37b2720b74aee9cb58858b19b5bb3ccf5a1d16b1..7f9a27ad2a714d40853d04558cc08321952cf671 100644 (file)
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ local sm_make_authenticated = require "core.sessionmanager".make_authenticated;
 local s2s_make_authenticated = require "core.s2smanager".make_authenticated;
 local base64 = require "util.encodings".base64;
 
-local cert_verify_identity = require "util.certverification".verify_identity;
+local cert_verify_identity = require "util.x509".verify_identity;
 
 local nodeprep = require "util.encodings".stringprep.nodeprep;
 local usermanager_get_sasl_handler = require "core.usermanager".get_sasl_handler;
diff --git a/util/certverification.lua b/util/certverification.lua
deleted file mode 100644 (file)
index d323f4b..0000000
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,211 +0,0 @@
--- Prosody IM
--- Copyright (C) 2010 Matthew Wild
--- Copyright (C) 2010 Paul Aurich
---
--- This project is MIT/X11 licensed. Please see the
--- COPYING file in the source package for more information.
---
-
--- TODO: I feel a fair amount of this logic should be integrated into Luasec,
--- so that everyone isn't re-inventing the wheel.  Dependencies on
--- IDN libraries complicate that.
-
-
--- [TLS-CERTS] - http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check-10
--- [XMPP-CORE] - http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-xmpp-3920bis-18
--- [SRV-ID]    - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4985
--- [IDNA]      - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5890
--- [LDAP]      - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4519
--- [PKIX]      - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280
-
-local nameprep = require "util.encodings".stringprep.nameprep;
-local idna_to_ascii = require "util.encodings".idna.to_ascii;
-local log = require "util.logger".init("certverification");
-
-module "certverification"
-
-local oid_commonname = "2.5.4.3"; -- [LDAP] 2.3
-local oid_subjectaltname = "2.5.29.17"; -- [PKIX] 4.2.1.6
-local oid_xmppaddr = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.5"; -- [XMPP-CORE]
-local oid_dnssrv   = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.7"; -- [SRV-ID]
-
--- Compare a hostname (possibly international) with asserted names
--- extracted from a certificate.
--- This function follows the rules laid out in
--- sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 of [TLS-CERTS]
---
--- A wildcard ("*") all by itself is allowed only as the left-most label
-local function compare_dnsname(host, asserted_names)
-       -- TODO: Sufficient normalization?  Review relevant specs.
-       local norm_host = idna_to_ascii(host)
-       if norm_host == nil then
-               log("info", "Host %s failed IDNA ToASCII operation", host)
-               return false
-       end
-
-       norm_host = norm_host:lower()
-
-       local host_chopped = norm_host:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "") -- everything after the first label
-
-       for i=1,#asserted_names do
-               local name = asserted_names[i]
-               if norm_host == name:lower() then
-                       log("debug", "Cert dNSName %s matched hostname", name);
-                       return true
-               end
-
-               -- Allow the left most label to be a "*"
-               if name:match("^%*%.") then
-                       local rest_name = name:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "")
-                       if host_chopped == rest_name:lower() then
-                               log("debug", "Cert dNSName %s matched hostname", name);
-                               return true
-                       end
-               end
-       end
-
-       return false
-end
-
--- Compare an XMPP domain name with the asserted id-on-xmppAddr
--- identities extracted from a certificate.  Both are UTF8 strings.
---
--- Per [XMPP-CORE], matches against asserted identities don't include
--- wildcards, so we just do a normalize on both and then a string comparison
---
--- TODO: Support for full JIDs?
-local function compare_xmppaddr(host, asserted_names)
-       local norm_host = nameprep(host)
-
-       for i=1,#asserted_names do
-               local name = asserted_names[i]
-
-               -- We only want to match against bare domains right now, not
-               -- those crazy full-er JIDs.
-               if name:match("[@/]") then
-                       log("debug", "Ignoring xmppAddr %s because it's not a bare domain", name)
-               else
-                       local norm_name = nameprep(name)
-                       if norm_name == nil then
-                               log("info", "Ignoring xmppAddr %s, failed nameprep!", name)
-                       else
-                               if norm_host == norm_name then
-                                       log("debug", "Cert xmppAddr %s matched hostname", name)
-                                       return true
-                               end
-                       end
-               end
-       end
-
-       return false
-end
-
--- Compare a host + service against the asserted id-on-dnsSRV (SRV-ID)
--- identities extracted from a certificate.
---
--- Per [SRV-ID], the asserted identities will be encoded in ASCII via ToASCII.
--- Comparison is done case-insensitively, and a wildcard ("*") all by itself
--- is allowed only as the left-most non-service label.
-local function compare_srvname(host, service, asserted_names)
-       local norm_host = idna_to_ascii(host)
-       if norm_host == nil then
-               log("info", "Host %s failed IDNA ToASCII operation", host);
-               return false
-       end
-
-       -- Service names start with a "_"
-       if service:match("^_") == nil then service = "_"..service end
-
-       norm_host = norm_host:lower();
-       local host_chopped = norm_host:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "") -- everything after the first label
-
-       for i=1,#asserted_names do
-               local asserted_service, name = asserted_names[i]:match("^(_[^.]+)%.(.*)");
-               if service == asserted_service then
-                       if norm_host == name:lower() then
-                               log("debug", "Cert SRVName %s matched hostname", name);
-                               return true;
-                       end
-
-                       -- Allow the left most label to be a "*"
-                       if name:match("^%*%.") then
-                               local rest_name = name:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "")
-                               if host_chopped == rest_name:lower() then
-                                       log("debug", "Cert SRVName %s matched hostname", name)
-                                       return true
-                               end
-                       end
-                       if norm_host == name:lower() then
-                               log("debug", "Cert SRVName %s matched hostname", name);
-                               return true
-                       end
-               end
-       end
-
-       return false
-end
-
-function verify_identity(host, service, cert)
-       local ext = cert:extensions()
-       if ext[oid_subjectaltname] then
-               local sans = ext[oid_subjectaltname];
-
-               -- Per [TLS-CERTS] 4.3, 4.4.4, "a client MUST NOT seek a match for a
-               -- reference identifier if the presented identifiers include a DNS-ID
-               -- SRV-ID, URI-ID, or any application-specific identifier types"
-               local had_supported_altnames = false
-
-               if sans[oid_xmppaddr] then
-                       had_supported_altnames = true
-                       if compare_xmppaddr(host, sans[oid_xmppaddr]) then return true end
-               end
-
-               if sans[oid_dnssrv] then
-                       had_supported_altnames = true
-                       -- Only check srvNames if the caller specified a service
-                       if service and compare_srvname(host, service, sans[oid_dnssrv]) then return true end
-               end
-
-               if sans["dNSName"] then
-                       had_supported_altnames = true
-                       if compare_dnsname(host, sans["dNSName"]) then return true end
-               end
-
-               -- We don't need URIs, but [TLS-CERTS] is clear.
-               if sans["uniformResourceIdentifier"] then
-                       had_supported_altnames = true
-               end
-
-               if had_supported_altnames then return false end
-       end
-
-       -- Extract a common name from the certificate, and check it as if it were
-       -- a dNSName subjectAltName (wildcards may apply for, and receive,
-       -- cat treats)
-       --
-       -- Per [TLS-CERTS] 1.5, a CN-ID is the Common Name from a cert subject
-       -- which has one and only one Common Name
-       local subject = cert:subject()
-       local cn = nil
-       for i=1,#subject do
-               local dn = subject[i]
-               if dn["oid"] == oid_commonname then
-                       if cn then
-                               log("info", "Certificate has multiple common names")
-                               return false
-                       end
-
-                       cn = dn["value"];
-               end
-       end
-
-       if cn then
-               -- Per [TLS-CERTS] 4.4.4, follow the comparison rules for dNSName SANs.
-               return compare_dnsname(host, { cn })
-       end
-
-       -- If all else fails, well, why should we be any different?
-       return false
-end
-
-return _M;
diff --git a/util/x509.lua b/util/x509.lua
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..d323f4b
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+-- Prosody IM
+-- Copyright (C) 2010 Matthew Wild
+-- Copyright (C) 2010 Paul Aurich
+--
+-- This project is MIT/X11 licensed. Please see the
+-- COPYING file in the source package for more information.
+--
+
+-- TODO: I feel a fair amount of this logic should be integrated into Luasec,
+-- so that everyone isn't re-inventing the wheel.  Dependencies on
+-- IDN libraries complicate that.
+
+
+-- [TLS-CERTS] - http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check-10
+-- [XMPP-CORE] - http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-xmpp-3920bis-18
+-- [SRV-ID]    - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4985
+-- [IDNA]      - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5890
+-- [LDAP]      - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4519
+-- [PKIX]      - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280
+
+local nameprep = require "util.encodings".stringprep.nameprep;
+local idna_to_ascii = require "util.encodings".idna.to_ascii;
+local log = require "util.logger".init("certverification");
+
+module "certverification"
+
+local oid_commonname = "2.5.4.3"; -- [LDAP] 2.3
+local oid_subjectaltname = "2.5.29.17"; -- [PKIX] 4.2.1.6
+local oid_xmppaddr = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.5"; -- [XMPP-CORE]
+local oid_dnssrv   = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.7"; -- [SRV-ID]
+
+-- Compare a hostname (possibly international) with asserted names
+-- extracted from a certificate.
+-- This function follows the rules laid out in
+-- sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 of [TLS-CERTS]
+--
+-- A wildcard ("*") all by itself is allowed only as the left-most label
+local function compare_dnsname(host, asserted_names)
+       -- TODO: Sufficient normalization?  Review relevant specs.
+       local norm_host = idna_to_ascii(host)
+       if norm_host == nil then
+               log("info", "Host %s failed IDNA ToASCII operation", host)
+               return false
+       end
+
+       norm_host = norm_host:lower()
+
+       local host_chopped = norm_host:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "") -- everything after the first label
+
+       for i=1,#asserted_names do
+               local name = asserted_names[i]
+               if norm_host == name:lower() then
+                       log("debug", "Cert dNSName %s matched hostname", name);
+                       return true
+               end
+
+               -- Allow the left most label to be a "*"
+               if name:match("^%*%.") then
+                       local rest_name = name:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "")
+                       if host_chopped == rest_name:lower() then
+                               log("debug", "Cert dNSName %s matched hostname", name);
+                               return true
+                       end
+               end
+       end
+
+       return false
+end
+
+-- Compare an XMPP domain name with the asserted id-on-xmppAddr
+-- identities extracted from a certificate.  Both are UTF8 strings.
+--
+-- Per [XMPP-CORE], matches against asserted identities don't include
+-- wildcards, so we just do a normalize on both and then a string comparison
+--
+-- TODO: Support for full JIDs?
+local function compare_xmppaddr(host, asserted_names)
+       local norm_host = nameprep(host)
+
+       for i=1,#asserted_names do
+               local name = asserted_names[i]
+
+               -- We only want to match against bare domains right now, not
+               -- those crazy full-er JIDs.
+               if name:match("[@/]") then
+                       log("debug", "Ignoring xmppAddr %s because it's not a bare domain", name)
+               else
+                       local norm_name = nameprep(name)
+                       if norm_name == nil then
+                               log("info", "Ignoring xmppAddr %s, failed nameprep!", name)
+                       else
+                               if norm_host == norm_name then
+                                       log("debug", "Cert xmppAddr %s matched hostname", name)
+                                       return true
+                               end
+                       end
+               end
+       end
+
+       return false
+end
+
+-- Compare a host + service against the asserted id-on-dnsSRV (SRV-ID)
+-- identities extracted from a certificate.
+--
+-- Per [SRV-ID], the asserted identities will be encoded in ASCII via ToASCII.
+-- Comparison is done case-insensitively, and a wildcard ("*") all by itself
+-- is allowed only as the left-most non-service label.
+local function compare_srvname(host, service, asserted_names)
+       local norm_host = idna_to_ascii(host)
+       if norm_host == nil then
+               log("info", "Host %s failed IDNA ToASCII operation", host);
+               return false
+       end
+
+       -- Service names start with a "_"
+       if service:match("^_") == nil then service = "_"..service end
+
+       norm_host = norm_host:lower();
+       local host_chopped = norm_host:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "") -- everything after the first label
+
+       for i=1,#asserted_names do
+               local asserted_service, name = asserted_names[i]:match("^(_[^.]+)%.(.*)");
+               if service == asserted_service then
+                       if norm_host == name:lower() then
+                               log("debug", "Cert SRVName %s matched hostname", name);
+                               return true;
+                       end
+
+                       -- Allow the left most label to be a "*"
+                       if name:match("^%*%.") then
+                               local rest_name = name:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "")
+                               if host_chopped == rest_name:lower() then
+                                       log("debug", "Cert SRVName %s matched hostname", name)
+                                       return true
+                               end
+                       end
+                       if norm_host == name:lower() then
+                               log("debug", "Cert SRVName %s matched hostname", name);
+                               return true
+                       end
+               end
+       end
+
+       return false
+end
+
+function verify_identity(host, service, cert)
+       local ext = cert:extensions()
+       if ext[oid_subjectaltname] then
+               local sans = ext[oid_subjectaltname];
+
+               -- Per [TLS-CERTS] 4.3, 4.4.4, "a client MUST NOT seek a match for a
+               -- reference identifier if the presented identifiers include a DNS-ID
+               -- SRV-ID, URI-ID, or any application-specific identifier types"
+               local had_supported_altnames = false
+
+               if sans[oid_xmppaddr] then
+                       had_supported_altnames = true
+                       if compare_xmppaddr(host, sans[oid_xmppaddr]) then return true end
+               end
+
+               if sans[oid_dnssrv] then
+                       had_supported_altnames = true
+                       -- Only check srvNames if the caller specified a service
+                       if service and compare_srvname(host, service, sans[oid_dnssrv]) then return true end
+               end
+
+               if sans["dNSName"] then
+                       had_supported_altnames = true
+                       if compare_dnsname(host, sans["dNSName"]) then return true end
+               end
+
+               -- We don't need URIs, but [TLS-CERTS] is clear.
+               if sans["uniformResourceIdentifier"] then
+                       had_supported_altnames = true
+               end
+
+               if had_supported_altnames then return false end
+       end
+
+       -- Extract a common name from the certificate, and check it as if it were
+       -- a dNSName subjectAltName (wildcards may apply for, and receive,
+       -- cat treats)
+       --
+       -- Per [TLS-CERTS] 1.5, a CN-ID is the Common Name from a cert subject
+       -- which has one and only one Common Name
+       local subject = cert:subject()
+       local cn = nil
+       for i=1,#subject do
+               local dn = subject[i]
+               if dn["oid"] == oid_commonname then
+                       if cn then
+                               log("info", "Certificate has multiple common names")
+                               return false
+                       end
+
+                       cn = dn["value"];
+               end
+       end
+
+       if cn then
+               -- Per [TLS-CERTS] 4.4.4, follow the comparison rules for dNSName SANs.
+               return compare_dnsname(host, { cn })
+       end
+
+       -- If all else fails, well, why should we be any different?
+       return false
+end
+
+return _M;